Volume 58

Issue 2

Article 14

February 1956

Insurance--Liability of Insurer for Unauthorized Act of Soliciting
Agent
H. G. U.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
H. G. U., Insurance--Liability of Insurer for Unauthorized Act of Soliciting Agent, 58 W. Va. L. Rev. (1956).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss2/14

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

U.: Insurance--Liability of Insurer for Unauthorized Act of Solicitin

CASE COMMENTS
542, 44 S.E. 2 8 (1903), cited by the court as its authority on this
point, were both cases where the deliveries and consequent waivers
were made by executive officers of the insurance companies involved.
The basic point submitted here is that insurance corporations
must necessarily transact their business through agents. VANCE,
INSURA E § 78 (3d ed. 1951). And since this is so, the courts must
scrutinize the facts meticulously before applying any rule of law
to a situation where such an agent is involved. Under all the
facts and circumstances, the decision in the principal case appears
to be wrong.
C. S. McG.

INSURANE-LIABILrTY OF INSURER FOR UNAUTHORIZED Acr OF
SOLICITING AGENT.-Deceased was accidentally killed after paying
first premium for life insurance contract with D. D's agent had
assured deceased of the immediate effectiveness of the policy. The
receipt for the premium payment included a statement that the policywould not be effective until a medical examination was completed.
Such examination did not take place prior to death. The beneficiaries appealed from a decision that no contract existed. Held, that the
issue of whether insurer was bound by unauthorized acts of agent
in stating that the policy became effective immediately, rather than
upon insured's passing a physical examination as indicated in the
application, was for the jury if the deceased in good faith relied
upon the statement of the agent. Gettins v. United States Life Ins.
Co., 221 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1955) (2-1 decision).
As was noted in Field v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 77 Utah
45, 290 Pac. 979 (1930), there is considerable confusion resulting
from decisions of the courts with regard to the powers of soliciting
agents of life insurers. It would seem that closer adherence to the
basic rules of agency law would result in a change in the decision of
the instant case as well as in many of those previously decided.
There is no question "that a contract of insurance can be made
by parol, unless prohibited by statute, or other positive regulation.
...
That it is not usually made in this way is no evidence that it
cannot be so made." Relief Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Shaw, 94 U.S.
574, 577 (1896). This validity of oral contracts of insurance coupled
with the well known inclination of many courts to construe the contract strongly in favor of the insured has led to decisions confirming
as a contract the unauthorized act of a soliciting agent. Modern
Woodmen of America v. Lawson, 110 Va. 81, 65 S.E. 509 (1909).
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It is submitted, however, that the power of a soliciting agent
to make contracts of insurance is limited. "So far as the insured
himself is concerned the agent must be held to have possessed
apparent authority commensurate with the business intrusted to
him." Green v. American Life 8: Accident Ins. Co., 93 S.W.2d 1119,
1124 (Mo. 1936). It is difficult to conceive how the deceased could
have relied in good faith upon the statement of the agent in the
instant case. The agreements of the parties may be expressed in
many papers, and in which paper the condition is expressed makes
no difference. See Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 187 U.S. 335, 346
(1902). "Any notice of limitation upon the agent's power, which
a prudent man is bound to regard, is equivalent of knowledge to
the insured." Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 568,
573, 131 S.E. 490, 492 (1926). Such notice in the receipt would put
the act of the agent not only beyond the scope of his actual authority, but also beyond the scope of his apparent authority. Thompson
v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy of the U.S., 199 N.C. 59, 65, 154 S.E.
21, 24 (1930).
Illustrative of the application of agency law to the problem of
the instant decision is the statement that one who deals with the
soliciting agent of a life insurance company must look to his authority. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 95 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1938). Again, basic rules were applied
where the court held that plain and unambiguous language in the
application and receipt as to the condition of the insurance contract
would be ample notice to the insured. Peoples Life Ins. Co. v.
Parker, 179 Va. 662, 20 S.E.2d 485 (1942).
It is difficult to conceive of a decision other than in favor of
the insurer upon the facts of the instant case had the court seen fit
to make a practical application of the law of agency. However,
the court based its decision upon an unreported majority opinion
reconstructed from the reported dissent of a lower court and as such
there may be some question as to the weight to be accorded the
decision in the instant case.
H. G. U.

JURIES-CHANGE OF VENIRE-DISCRETION OF TRIAL JUDGE.-D was

indicted for murder arising out of a violent labor dispute. The
trial judge, being of the opinion that qualified jurors could not be
found in the county of venue, ordered jurors to be drawn from a
neighboring county, under authority of West Virginia statute. W.
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